


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171

25X1

November 13, 1975

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110009-8

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

25X1

CONTENTS

November 13, 1975

Soviet-US Dialogue on CSCE Implementation. . . . 1

25X1

Soviets Hedge on
Portuguese Timor 7

Romania: An Unusual Case of Sabotage. 8

Hard Line from Slovakia
on European Party Conference 9

Soviet-US Dialogue on CSCE Implementation

Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko responded yesterday in a substantive way to a US demarche on CSCE implementation. This indicates that Moscow feels compelled to engage in a serious dialogue with the US on implementation issues.

Moscow has consistently held that the provisions of the Helsinki agreement are not automatically self-implementing but must be negotiated bilaterally. Moreover, with a follow-up meeting of CSCE signatories scheduled to take place in Belgrade in 1977, the Soviets have an interest in appearing to be responsive to Western initiatives.

Moscow would also like to appear to be cooperative and to be living up to the letter, and even the spirit of the agreement. Thus, the Soviets have asserted that they, in contrast to the US, have widely disseminated the text of the agreement. Moreover, they have, as provided for in the text, approved multiple exit/entry visas for US journalists, a procedure that was also extended to the French during Giscard's visit.

Appearances notwithstanding, the Soviets are also laying out the limits to which they will go. They have been particularly unreceptive on the military-related aspects of CSCE, the so-called confidence-building measures, refusing to acknowledge Western advance notification of military exercises or to send observers to them, as provided by the conference document. They have also stressed the aspects of the conference document they regard as advantageous, especially the statement on "inviolability of frontiers."

In addition to putting forth their own interpretations of what the Helsinki agreement does and does not require, the Soviets, as well as the East Europeans, have been quick to try and put the West on

November 13, 1975

25X1

the defensive. Thus Korniyenko complained about problems the Soviets have had in obtaining US visas and the inadequate dissemination of the CSCE text in the US. He also threw in an attack on Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America broadcasts as incompatible with the Helsinki agreement.

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November 13, 1975

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Soviets Hedge on Portuguese Timor



The Soviets have been slow to take a stand on the Timor issue. Their sparse press coverage suggests some sympathy for Fretilin, but goes no further than to identify it as a left-wing group.

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
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Moscow is apparently loathe to upset its improving relations with Jakarta by rendering anything more than the most superficial acknowledgement to an insurgent faction whose leftist credentials have yet to be firmly established.

25X1

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November 13, 1975

25X1

Romania: An Unusual Case of Sabotage

In an unprecedented move, Bucharest has publicly revealed that a military officer has committed serious sabotage.

On October 28, the party daily *Scinteia* carried a brief announcement that the death sentence for sabotage against Navy Commander Mihai Rusu had been commuted by presidential decree to 15 to 20 years in prison.

There is not likely to be any further publicity on the case, and the gossip-loving Romanians will probably see the real significance of the story in the questions it leaves unanswered. They will wonder--as do we--about why President Ceausescu granted executive clemency to a serving officer whose crime warranted the firing squad. There will surely be speculation about what Rusu did and whether he acted alone or on behalf of others--Romanian or foreign.

Stories of sabotage periodically circulate in Bucharest. A flurry of rumors about sabotage by unhappy industrial workers a little more than a year ago centered on poor working conditions in factories. None of them mentioned military men or any kind of destruction at military installations.

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November 13, 1975

Hard Line from Slovakia
on European Party Conference

A recent article on international communism in the Slovak party daily, *Pravda*, may further roil the troubled waters surrounding the preparations of the European Communist Party Conference (ECPC). It also demonstrates the widening gulf between the loyalist and independent wings of the movement.

Written by Ivan Hlivka, the Slovak media's chief commentator on the ECPC, the article reflects frustration with the footdragging that has repeatedly delayed the project. It is substantially harsher than one Hlivka published in February. Independent-minded parties, which are subjected to a thinly veiled attack in the article, will undoubtedly be tempted to respond in kind.

In a direct slap at the French, Italian, and Spanish parties, Hlivka echoes the Zorodov line, blasting the adoption of "neutralism" by non-ruling Communist parties in order to court the favor of national electorates. Such independent posturing and "disassociation from the common fight," he argues, carries "the danger of slipping into nationalism." He also warns against divisive bourgeois tactics aimed at misleading Communists into publicly "proving" that they are independent of Moscow.

In a potshot at the Romanian and Yugoslav parties, Hlivka asserts that the "old opportunism" is constantly striving to strengthen itself with new, "modern" arguments and methods of struggle. He says the basis of this approach--nationalism--is the most dangerous weapon of anti-communist strategy.

Hlivka flatly rejects the Yugoslav and Romanian view that the Comintern rode roughshod over the rights and interests of the individual parties in deference to Moscow's "narrow national" interests. All such *

November 13, 1975

attacks on proletarian internationalism, he contends, are "intended to evoke aversion" to united action by the movement.

The independent parties may pick up the gauntlet thrown down by Hlivka at the next session of the drafting commission expected to be convened soon in East Berlin.

25X1

November 13, 1975

-10-

25X1